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DOES QUALITY AFFECT PATIENTS’ CHOICE OF DOCTOR?
EVIDENCE FROM ENGLAND*
Rita Santos, Hugh Gravelle and Carol Propper
Reforms giving users of public services choice of provider aim to improve quality. But such reforms will
work only if quality affects choice of provider.We test this crucial prerequisite in the English health care
market by examining the choice of 3.4 million individuals of family doctor. Family doctor practices
provide primary care and control access to non-emergency hospital care, the quality of their clinical
care is measured and published and care is free. In this setting, clinical quality should affect choice.We
find that a 1 standard deviation increase in clinical quality would increase practice size by around 17%.
Governments in the UK and internationally have increasingly turned to policies to
create or enhance consumer choice for public services including education, employ-
ment services, health care, public housing and social care (Besley and Ghatak, 2003;
Pawson et al., 2006; Frontier Economics, 2010; Musset, 2012; Vrangbaek et al., 2012).
Giving consumers the power to choose their public service supplier, it is argued, will
produce a better match of consumers and suppliers, and give suppliers an incentive to
provide higher quality (Hoxby, 2003; Le Grand, 2003).
Choice is a popular reform model in health care, adopted by administrations of
different political orientation, including the USA, the UK, Denmark, Italy (Lombardy),
the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden (Thompson and Dixon, 2006). A necessary
condition for greater patient choice to improve quality is that a provider will face higher
demand if they improve their quality. This is the question we address here. We do so by
examining the choice of family doctor in the English National Health Service (NHS).
This is an important setting. First, all individuals in theUK are entitled to choose anNHS
family doctor practice andneed to do so, as family doctors provide almost all primary care
and are also the gatekeepers for any specialist or non-emergency hospital care the
individual may need. Primary care is where most people will have regular interactions
with the health care system. Thus, the decision is salient for a large number of people.
Second, good quality treatment by primary care physicians can prevent declines in health
that result in the need for more expensive secondary care and family doctors guide
patients to the most appropriate provider when secondary care is required. Quality of
primary care therefore has important implications for both patient health and welfare
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and the public finances. Third, primary care is free at point of use, so whether individuals
take account of quality when choosing a family doctor is more likely to be revealed in this
setting. Fourth, because of the introduction of a pay for performance scheme in 2004
(Roland, 2004), there is uniquely good, and publically available, data on clinical quality
for all English general practices. Finally, many other health care systems have similar
settings – gatekeeping primary care providers and low direct monetary costs of using
primary care (Saltman et al., 2006) – so that evidence from the UK has wider relevance.
We use data on the choices made by nearly 3.4 million adults aged 25 and over from
amongst nearly 1,000 family doctor practices to examine the determinants of choice of
practice and, in particular, to test whether quality affects choice. Our data contain a rich
set ofmeasures of practice quality, as well as information on thedistances frompatients to
potential practices, and characteristics of the practice which have been shown to
influence choice of patients, including the age and gender of the doctors in the practice,
their country of qualification and the type of contract the practice has with the NHS.1
We find that individuals are more likely to choose practices which are of higher
quality as measured by publicly available data on practice performance. The positive
effect of clinical quality on choice is robust across age and gender groups, to the socio-
economic characteristics of the small areas in which the individuals reside, to allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and to the potential endogeneity of the
clinical quality measure. We also find that distance is important – as expected given
that health care has a strong local dimension – so valuation of practices decreases with
distance from the individual’s home. People are also more likely to choose practices
which have a higher proportion of general practitioners (GPs) qualified in Europe, a
higher proportion of female GPs and a lower average GP age.
The responsiveness of choice to practice quality is economically meaningful as well as
statistically significant. The relevant effect for assessing the potential incentive for
practices to improve quality is the increase in the number of individuals whowish to join a
practice when its quality increases. Around 25,000 adults aged 25 and over live within
2 km of the average practice, so even small changes in the probability that an individual
will choose a practice can lead to a sizeable increase in the practice list. Using our most
conservative estimates, an increase of 1 standard deviation (SD) in clinical quality will
increase the number of individuals over the age of 25 choosing a practice by just over 900,
or around 17% of the mean number of such patients in a practice.
Our results contribute to the literature on choice in health care.2 Most studies that
have examined the effect of quality have been undertaken in the context of choice of
1 Our measures of practice quality are discussed in detail in subsection 2.3.
2 There is a related literature on provider competition in health care. The theoretical literature is
generally supportive of the proposition that greater competition improves quality if prices are regulated
(Gaynor, 2006), though there are caveats about the role of imperfect information and the required
assumptions about provider cost functions and patient preferences (Gravelle, 1999; Gravelle and Masiero,
2000; Karlsson, 2007; Brekke et al., 2010; Gravelle et al., 2012; Halonen and Propper, 2012). Most empirical
studies find that when providers face fixed prices, greater competition is associated with higher quality (for
reviews, see Gaynor and Town, 2012; Gravelle et al., 2012). For England, Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor
et al. (2013) report that the lifting of restrictions on patient choice of hospital led to faster reductions in
acute myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality for providers facing more competition. In an exploratory cross-
sectional study of competition in primary care, Pike (2010) found that practices with more rivals within
500 m have higher quality (as measured by patient satisfaction and a measure of clinical care).
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hospital rather than of family doctor. US-based studies of patient choice of hospital
(Luft et al., 1990; Burns and Wholey, 1992; Tay, 2003; Cutler et al., 2004; Howard, 2005;
Ho, 2006; Pope, 2009) find that higher hospital quality increases demand. Similar
findings have been reported for the Netherlands (Varkevisser et al., 2012), Italy
(Moscone et al., 2012) and England (Beckert et al., 2012; Gaynor et al., 2012; Sivey,
2012). In the US, the introduction of report cards for health insurance plans and
hospitals have led patients to choose better quality plans and providers (Scanlon et al.,
2002; Wedig and Tai-Seale, 2002; Kolstad and Chernew, 2009).
There are few studies of the effects of quality on patient choice of family doctors,
perhaps because of the previous lack of good data on quality. Research has focused on
other attributes of care or proxies for quality. Studies have shown the importance of
distance (for the UK, Salisbury, 1989; Billinghurst and Whitfield, 1993; Dixon et al.,
1997; McLean and Sutton, 2005; for Norway, Godager, 2009), other aspects of
accessibility such as opening hours (Dixon et al., 1997), and the age, gender and
ethnicity of doctors (Godager, 2009).3 Stated preference studies have shown that,
hypothetically, patients are willing to trade-off measures of consultation quality,
thoroughness of physical examinations and the GP’s knowledge of the patient against
the accessibility of the consultation and waiting times (Vick and Scott, 1998; Scott and
Vick, 1999; Cheraghi-Sohi et al., 2008). Revealed preference evidence on the
relationship between choice of practice and proxies for quality is more mixed
(McLean and Sutton, 2005), though studies from Norway found small positive
responses to factors such as practice mortality rates and the volume of services provided
(Biorn and Godager, 2010; Iversen and Luras, 2011).
More broadly, our article contributes to the literature on whether choice-based
reforms in public services will provide incentives for firms to increase quality. There has
been a great deal of interest in recent years in competition in education (Epple and
Romano, 1998; Hoxby, 2000; Epple et al., 2004). In this literature, as in health care, the
predictions from theoretical models are often ambiguous and the empirical evidence
contested (Hoxby, 2000; Bayer and McMillan, 2005; Burgess et al., 2005; Rothstein,
2007). Here, we show that quality matters to users of health care when they are
choosing an important service provider. Thus a necessary condition for policies that
promote choice and competition amongst providers to succeed in improving quality is
satisfied in the UK primary health care market.
The article is organised as follows. Section 1 outlines the institutional setting,
Section 2 discusses the data, Section 3 our empirical strategy, Section 4 presents the
key results, Section 5 exploits these to examine the effect of changes in quality on
demand and Section 6 concludes.
1. Institutional Setting
The NHS is financed almost entirely from general taxation and patients face no
charges for NHS health care apart from a small charge for dispensed medicines. To
receive NHS primary care individuals must register with a general (family) practice,
3 In the absence of any measures of clinical quality such attributes may be used by consumers as signals of a
better match and so higher clinical quality.
© 2015 The Authors.
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which also acts as the gatekeeper for elective (non-emergency) hospital care. GPs are
not employees of the NHS (apart from a small proportion directly employed by
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), the local NHS organisations responsible for the
administration of primary care in their area). GPs work in general practices, most of
which are limited liability partnerships owned by the GPs. The NHS contracts with the
general practices, not with the individual GPs. English practices have on average
4.2 GPs and around 6,600 patients (Information Centre, 2011).
Practice contracts with the NHS to supply services to patients are of two types.
Just over half of general practices have the General Medical Services (GMS)
contract whose terms are set by national negotiations between the NHS and the
British Medical Association (the doctors’ trade union). GMS practices are paid a
mixture of lump sums, capitation, quality incentive payments and items of service.
Around 75% of practice revenue varies with the number of patients registered with
the practice. Over 50% is from capitation payments determined by a national
formula which takes account of the demographic mix of practice patients and local
morbidity measures. Quality incentives from the Quality and Outcomes Framework
(QOF) (Roland, 2004) generate a further 15% of practice revenue. For a given
quality level as measured by the QOF score, revenue increases with the number of
patients. Practice payments for providing specific services including vaccinating and
screening target proportions of the relevant practice population also increase with
the total number of patients registered with the practice. Practices are reimbursed
for the costs of their premises but have to fund all other expenses, such as hiring
practice nurses and clerical staff, from their revenue.
The remaining practices have a Primary Medical Services (PMS) contract which is
negotiated between the practice and their local PCT. The practice receives a lump
sum for agreeing to provide similar services to those required under the GMS
contract, plus additional services for particular patient groups. The amount received
is typically what the practice would have received under GMS, plus an addition to
cover the cost of the extra services. PMS practices also receive QOF payments, though
they are paid less than GMS practices for the same quality achievement because some
of the QOF payments relate to activities which are also paid for directly under PMS
contracts. As under GMS the practice has to meet its expenses from its revenue.
Thus, whether the practice has a GMS or a PMS contract, its total revenue will
increase with the number of patients. A rough estimate under the assumption that
average revenue and cost per patient are constant is that an additional patient
registered with the practice produces revenue of £135, expenses of £80 and net
income of £55 per practice partner.4
Although practices cannot refuse to accept patients on grounds of race, gender,
social class, age, religion, sexual orientation, appearance, disability or medical
condition, patients face two constraints when choosing a practice. First, a practice
4 In 2009/10 there were 26,420 GP contractors (i.e. joint owners rather than salaried employees) in
England with average gross income £287,1001, expenses of £168,700 and net income of £109,400. There were
2,066 registered patients per GP contractor. See: GP Earnings and Expenses 2009/10, http://
www.hscic.gov.uk/pubs/gpearnex0910 (last accessed: 10 March 2015); General and Personal Medical
Services, England 2001–11, http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB05214 (last accessed: 10 March 2015).
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can refuse to accept patients who live outside a catchment area agreed with its PCT.
Second, practices can notify their PCT that their list is closed: if this is the case, no new
patients will be accepted for a period of between 3 and 12 months. Around 2% of
practices have closed lists at any one time.5 Practices with closed lists are not eligible for
certain types of payments for providing additional services, so that some practices tell
potential new patients that they are ‘open but full’ in an attempt to restrict registration.
Possibly up to 10% of practices are open but full at any time (National Audit Office,
2008) but since the designation is unofficial and has no legal force its extent and effect
on registrations are unclear. We discuss the implications of these restrictions on
patient choice of practice in section 4.5.6
One of the strands in policy in the English NHS in recent years has been the
promotion of competition amongst hospitals and, latterly, amongst general practices
(Department of Health, 2010). The national body which controlled entry of new
practices was abolished in 2002 and the Department of Health introduced a
tendering process to make it easier for new practices to be established, especially in
under-doctored areas (Department of Health, 2006). A website, NHS Choices, has
been set up containing information on the characteristics of practices, such as the
clinics they offer, their performance under the national quality incentive (QOF)
scheme and results from patient satisfaction surveys.7 And from 2015 practices will
be able to register patients who live outside their catchment area without the
obligation to make home visits, thus widening patients’ choice of practice (Mays
et al., 2014).8
2. Data
We construct a rich data set on patients and practices by linking NHS administrative
data sets (Attribution Data Set (ADS), General Medical Statistics, QOF, Hospital
Episode Statistics) with small area census and socio-economic data from Neighbour-
hood Statistics. Sources are in Appendix Table C1.
2.1. Patients
The ADS contains, for each administratively defined homogenous small geographical
area in England (known as a lower super output area, LSOA), the number of patients
by age/sex band who are registered with each general practice at 1 April 2010. There
5 House of Commons, Hansard Written Answers for 28 April 2008.
6 GPs can deregister patients if there is a fundamental breakdown in their relationship. It has been estimated
that each year 0.1% of patients are deregistered (Munro et al., 2002). If a patient cannot find a practice
prepared to accept them, they can ask their PCT to find them a practice and PCTs can assign patients to
practices. Around 0.5% of patients are assigned to practices (Audit Commission, 2004).
7 http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Yourchoices/GPchoice/Pages/ChoosingaGP.aspx. Detailed infor-
mation on performance of practices in an area under the national P4P scheme is also available via http://
www.qof.ic.nhs.uk/search/ and information from surveys of patient satisfaction is available at http://www.gp-
patient.co.uk/info/ (all last accessed 10 March 2015).
8 The NHS Choices website notes: ‘The idea is to provide you with greater choice and to improve the
quality of GP services over time, as GPs providing a good service are naturally more popular’. http://
www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/AboutNHSservices/doctors/Pages/patient-choice-GP-practices.aspx (accessed 27
November 2014).
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are 32,482 LSOAs in England, with a minimum population of 1,000 and a mean
population of 1,500.9 To reduce the computational burden, we limit our analysis to the
choice of practice by patients resident in the East Midlands Strategic Health Authority
(SHA). This contains 2,875 LSOAs, has a mixture of densely populated urban areas
and rural areas, has a diverse population (so allowing investigation of the effects of
ethnicity and other socio-economic characteristics on tastes for practice characteristics)
and it is far from the English-Welsh and English-Scottish borders (so we do not have to
drop any LSOAs with residents registered in Welsh or Scottish practices whose
characteristics we do not observe).10 We exclude children because their practice
choices are made by their parents and we cannot distinguish in our data between
individuals with and without children. We also exclude individuals aged 18–24 because
students in post-high school education may continue to be registered at their parents’
general practice despite living away from home. We therefore analyse the choice of
practice by the 3.372 million individuals in the East Midlands SHA who are aged 25
and over.11
The ADS data contain age (in bands) and gender of each patient. We attribute socio-
economic characteristics to patients by their LSOA of residence. The characteristics
include the proportion of the LSOA who are income deprived (defined as receiving
income-related social security benefits), the proportion of adults with no formal
educational qualifications, the proportion who report themselves in fair or good,
rather than poor, self-rated health and the proportion who are of Asian ethnicity. We
also categorise an LSOA as urban or rural and by the annual rate of inward migration.
These patient and small area-level variables allow us to examine whether different types
of patient have different preferences over practice characteristics.
2.2. Practice Characteristics
We use data from the GMS census (taken on 30 September 2010 and 2009) to measure
the average age of GPs, the proportion of female GPs and the proportion of GPs
qualified in the UK, in Europe, in Asia and elsewhere. We also have data on the type of
practice contract (PMS or GMS) and whether the practice has opted out of providing
out-of-hours care for its patients.12 There are no centrally collected practice-level data
on practice catchment areas, or whether practice lists are open, closed or open but full.
9 On average over England the population registered with general practices is about 7% greater than
estimates of the population derived from the decennial population census (Ashworth et al., 2005). The
difference is due to lags in the updating of patient registration data when patients die or change practice.
Since general practices are paid according to their registered lists it is appropriate to model the determinants
of the number of patients registered with practices as we wish to examine whether practices are paid more, via
larger lists, when their quality is greater.
10 The ADS includes patients resident in England and registered with practices located in Wales and
Scotland.
11 There is no reliable information about individuals who are not registered with NHS general practices
but they are likely to be a very small proportion of patients. For example, Davies et al. (2013) estimate that
0.5% of hospital admissions are of patients not registered with a general practice. Our model provides
consistent estimates of the effect of quality on choices amongst NHS practices for individuals (the vast
majority) who choose to register with an NHS practice.
12 Data on the type of contract are missing for 13 practices and rather than reduce the number of practices
we assume they had GMS contracts and include a dummy variable indicating that the contract status is
imputed.
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2.3. Practice Quality
Our measure of practice clinical quality is from the QOF. The QOF is a national pay-
for-performance scheme introduced in April 2004 and whose broad structure has been
maintained subsequently. The quality indicators in the QOF were chosen on the basis
of evidence about the effects of the activities they measure on patient health. Higher
achievement of the quality indicators has been shown to be associated with fewer
emergency hospitalisations for conditions which should be managed in primary care
(Dusheiko et al., 2011).13 From 2006/7 practices could receive up to 1,000 points for
achieving quality indicators grouped into four domains (clinical, organisation, patient
experience and additional services) and for a holistic care indicator. Each point earned
the practice £125.14 We use total QOF points for 2006/7. We choose a four-year lagged
measure (choice of practice is observed for 2010) to reduce reverse causality from
patient choices to quality.
2.4. Distance Measurement and Choice Sets
Figure 1 shows the practices and LSOAs in the East Midlands. Some practices have
more than one surgery (on average each practice had 1.27 surgeries). We calculated
the straight line distance between the centroid of each LSOA and all GP surgeries
within 50 km of LSOAs in the East Midlands SHA. We use the distance to the nearest
branch surgery of a practice from the LSOA centroid as our measure of practice
distance. In deciding the appropriate radius for the choice sets facing individuals in
LSOAs we make a trade-off. Setting a wider radius increases the computation burden as
more practices are in choice sets but also (see Figure 2) reduces the proportion of the
population excluded from the model because their chosen practice is not in the choice
set of their LSOA. Based on the data on actual choices, for our baseline model we use a
radius of 10 km. This covers the choices of over 99% of the population. Since some
urban LSOAs had over 100 practices within 10 km we further restrict the choice set to
the 30 practices closest to the centroid of the LSOA. We also estimate models with
smaller radii and with different radii for rural and urban LSOAs.15
Practices are supervised by administrative bodies known as PCTs. Although
patients are not required to register with practices located in the PCT in which they
live, they may be less likely to choose practices in a different PCT because PCTs
13 Appendix A discusses other measures of quality and the results from a set of robustness checks using
these measures. The measures include sub-domains of the QOF, different years of the QOF, indices derived
from the raw QOF data, practice emergency hospital admission rates for conditions which should be treatable
in primary care and responses from patient satisfaction surveys.
14 The domains, points and indicators in 2006/7 were as follows. Clinical (80 indicators covering 19
conditions, carrying 655 points in total), organisation (43 indicators carrying 181 points for record keeping,
medicines management, education and training,), patient experience (four indicators carrying 108 points for
length of consultations and having undertaken patient surveys) and additional services (eight indicators
carrying 36 points for services including cervical screening, child health surveillance, maternity and
contraception). The holistic care indicator carried up to 20 points on the basis of performance in the third
worst condition in the clinical domain. The data to compute these indicators are extracted directly from the
patients’ electronic health records held by each practice.
15 Since the choice set for patients in LSOAs is defined only by distance, it satisfies the uniform
conditioning property that it is not affected by which practices are chosen by patients in that LSOA.
McFadden (1978) shows uniform conditioning is sufficient for consistency in the conditional logit model.
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provide information about practices located within the PCT. Moreover, PCT
boundaries are in part determined by physical features such as railway lines and
rivers which may make it more difficult to access a practice than is suggested by the
Luton
Rugby
Derby
Oxford
Dudley
Oldham
Lincoln
Bedford
Walsall
Grimsby
Halifax
Nuneaton
CoventrySolihull
Stafford
Bradford
Cambridge
Rotherham
Leicester
Mansfield
Halesowen
Sheffield
Doncaster
Wakefield
Nottingham
Birmingham
Scunthorpe
Northampton
Peterborough
Chesterfield
Huddersfield
Milton Keynes
Wolverhampton
Heme
Kingston upon Hull
N
Legend
GP practices
Strategic Health Authorities
LSOAs 500 25 Km
Leeds
Fig. 1. East Midlands Strategic Health Authority: Practice Locations and LSOAs
© 2015 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
8 T H E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L
straight line distance. To allow for this, in estimation we take account of whether
practices are in the same PCT as the LSOA of the patient.
2.5. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the practice characteristics, distances and the small area (LSOA)
characteristics.16 Over a third (37%) of GPs in practices are female and over a quarter
(27%) were trained outside Europe.17 The mean distance to the nearest practice is
1.2 km and the mean distance to practices within the LSOA choice set is 4.8 km. There
are on average 22 practices within the choice set of each LSOA. The mean distance to
the chosen practice is 1.9 km and its distribution, shown in Figure 2, is right skewed as
41% of East Midlands SHA patients are registered with the nearest GP practice.
Around 25% of practices in LSOA choice sets are located in a different PCT and 16%
of patients choose a practice in a different PCT.
3. Empirical Approach
We estimate conditional logit models of choice of practice. There are nA LSOAs
and their choice sets contain nJ different practices in total. All na residents in LSOA
a choose a practice from the same set Ca : na ¼
P
j2Ca naj , where naj is the number
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16 There were 981 practices in East Midlands choice sets. We drop eight practices without 2006/7 QOF
data.
17 We do not have data on ethnicity or first language of GPs but the majority of doctors trained outside
Europe will not have English as a first language.
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of LSOA a residents who choose practice j. The number of residents choos-
ing practice j is nj ¼
PnA
a¼1 naj and there are N ¼
PnJ
j¼1 nj ¼
PnA
a¼1 na residents in
total.
Suppose that utility for individual i living in LSOA a if he chooses practice j is
representable by the linear function
uiaj ¼ viaj þ eiaj ¼ x0iajbþ eiaj ; (1)
xiaj = (x1iaj, . . . , xKiaj) is a vector of K observed variables and eiaj is random error term
reflecting practice characteristics observed by the individual i but not the econome-
trician. Each resident i in LSOA a chooses the practice in their choice set Ca which
yields the highest realised value of uiaj.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median SD Min Max N
GP practice characteristics
Average GP age (years) 2009 47.8 46.7 6.7 31.5 72 981
Proportion female GPs 2009 0.365 0.400 0.248 0 1 981
Proportion GPs trained outside
Europe 2009
0.265 0.100 0.352 0 1 981
Opted out of out of hours care
2009
0.586 1 0.493 0 1 981
PMS contract 2009 0.483 0 0.500 0 1 981
Dispensing practice 2009 0.207 0 0.405 0 1 981
Patients* aged 25 and over
registered with practice
4,902 4,269 3,071 653 24,988 981
Quality measure
QOF 2006/7 total points 955.5 980.1 64.6 426.5 1,000 973
Average distances from LSOA to practices
Distance to practices in LSOA
choice set (km)
4.757 4.777 1.727 0.348 9.888 2,875
Distance to chosen practice (km) 1.877 1.480 1.341 0.125 9.867 2,875
Distance to nearest practice (km) 1.197 0.842 1.162 0.023 9.810 2,875
Practices in different PCT
Proportion practices in choice set
in different PCT
0.247 0.133 0.273 0 1 2,875
Proportion chosen practices in
different PCT
0.160 0 0.231 0 1 2,875
Proportion of nearest practices in
different PCT
0.049 0 0.217 0 1 2,875
LSOA characteristics
Income deprivation score 0.143 0.106 0.110 0.013 0.830 2,875
Proportion of adults without
qualification
0.231 0.231 0.071 0.035 0.430 2,875
Proportion pop in fair or good
self-rated health
0.907 0.911 0.032 0.760 0.983 2,875
Proportion non white 0.065 0.019 0.013 0 0.095 2,875
Rural 0.269 0 0.444 0 1 2,875
Population inflow 2009/10 (%) 5.07 4.58 2.14 1.72 18.62 2,875
Population growth 2009/10 (%) 0.06 0.07 0.72 3.44 4.46 2,875
Proportion population registered
at nearest practice
0.408 0.350 0.266 0 1 2,875
Number of practices in LSOA
choice set
22.4 30 10.3 1 33 2,875
Note. *Whether resident in the East Midlands SHA or outside it.
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If the eiaj errors are independently and identically distributed according to the type 1
extreme value distribution, then (McFadden, 1974) the probability that individual i in
LSOA a chooses practice j is
Piaj ¼ expðx0iajbÞ
X
‘2Ca expðx
0
ia‘bÞ
h i1
: (2)
If we assume, as in most of our models, that individuals’ preferences over practice
characteristics do not vary across different types of individual, only variables which vary
by LSOA and practice (xaj) will affect choice probabilities and thus the probability of
choice of practice j by an individual in LSOA a is the same for all individuals in LSOA a.
Hence,
Piaj ¼ Paj ¼ expðx0ajbÞ
X
‘2Ca expðx
0
a‘bÞ
h i1
; (3)
and the log-likelihood is
ln L ¼
XnA
a¼1
X
j 02Ca naj ln
expðx0ajbÞP
‘2Ca expðx0a‘bÞ
" #
; (4)
so that the log of the choice probability for practice j in choice set Ca is weighted by the
number of individuals in LSOA a who choose practice j.
We examine our assumption of homogeneous individual preferences in three ways.
First, we estimate separate models, using (4), for each age and gender group, so that
naj is now the number of residents in an LSOA in a given age/gender band who choose
practice j. Second, to investigate whether preferences for practices vary with LSOA
characteristics, we stratify LSOAs separately by the proportion of the population who
are income deprived, who are non-white, who have no educational qualifications or
who are in fair or good self-reported health. We also estimate separate models based on
the amount of inward mobility in the LSOA, on the assumption that LSOAs with more
inward mobility will be composed of populations which, on average, have made choices
of GP more recently. Third, we allow the coefficients b in individual utility functions to
vary randomly across individuals according to a normal distribution and we estimate
mixed logit models of their mean and SD.
4. Results
4.1. The Effect of Quality, Distance and Practice Characteristics
Table 2 presents our baseline model. Quality is measured by four-year lagged total
QOF points (2006/7) and we allow for non-linearity of utility in distance with a cubic
function of distance from the LSOA centroid to the nearest surgery of the practice.
Other covariates are practice characteristics: whether the practice is in the same PCT as
the LSOA, mean GP age in months, percentage of female GPs, percentage of GPs
qualified outside Europe, whether the practice has a PMS contract and whether the
practice has opted-out of providing out-of-hours cover.
The reported coefficients have the same sign as the effect of an attribute on
the probability of choice ½@P^aj=@xkaj ¼ b^kP^ajð1 P^ajÞ. They estimate the marginal
utility from the practice characteristics only up to a positive scalar since
© 2015 The Authors.
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uiaj ¼ kuiaj ¼ kx0iajbþ keiaj yields the same choices as uiaj for all k > 0. Since the scale is
determined by the variance of the sample on which the model is estimated, we also
report the marginal rate of substitution between practice quality qj and the distance daj
in kilometres between the LSOA centroid and the practice. MRSqd is the additional
distance in kilometres that a patient in LSOA a would be willing to travel to practice j if
its quality increased by 1 point. Since it is the ratio of marginal utilities it is invariant
with respect to the scale of utility. Thus comparison of the MRSqd for different samples
of patients conveys information about differences in preferences.18
Table 2 shows that patients are more likely to choose a practice with higher quality.
They dislike distance, preferring practices that are closer to their homes, and,
conditional on distance, practices in the same PCT.19 In terms of GP characteristics,
patients prefer practices with younger GPs, with a higher proportion of female GPs,
with a lower proportion of non-European qualified GPs, practices that have opted out
of out-of-hours cover and those with PMS contracts. These results for practice gender
Table 2
Choice of Practice: Marginal Utility of Quality, Distance, and Practice Characteristics
Co-efficient
QOF 2006/7 total points 0.00222***
(0.00016)
Distance 0.7512***
(0.0163)
Practice in different PCT 0.881***
(0.044)
Average GP age (months) 0.00214***
(0.00014)
Percentage of female GPs 0.00239***
(0.00034)
Percentage of non-European qualified GPs 0.00527***
(0.00028)
Opted out of 24 hours obligation 0.160***
(0.037)
PMS contract 0.148***
(0.033)
BIC 11,597,725
McFadden R2 0.3991
N LSOA 2,870
N practices 973
N patients 3,291,581
MRS distance for quality 0.00296***
(0.00022)
Notes. Conditional logit model of choice of practice by patients aged 25 and over. Model also contained a
dummy for missing PMS status. The distance coefficient is b^d þ 2b^d2 d þ 3b^d3d2 where d and d2 are computed
as the mean of the LSOA centroid to practice distance in km and the squared distance for the whole sample.
MRS is the coefficient on quality divided by the distance coefficient. Standard errors clustered at LSOA level
are in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
18 Since utility depends on a cubic function of distance, the marginal rate of substitution varies across
practices and LSOAs: MRS
aj
qd ¼ ð@uiaj=@dajÞ=ð@uiaj=@qj Þ ¼ b^q=ðb^d þ 2b^d2daj þ 3b^d3d2aj Þ. We report the
MRSqd computed at the mean distance to the practices from LSOA centroids. Following Hole (2007), we
estimate standard errors using the delta method.
19 As PCTs boundaries may reflect physical features that are hard to cross, we interpret the coefficient on
PCT as a (non-linear) distance parameter.
© 2015 The Authors.
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and ethnicity mix and average age are robust across all estimated models and confirm
earlier research findings on the choice of GPs in the UK.20
In Appendix A, we examine the robustness of these results to a large set of
alternative measures of quality. These include total QOF points for other years, sub-
domains of the QOF, the practice rate of hospital admissions for conditions which
ought to be manageable in general practice and patient satisfaction measures based on
practice surveys. The results confirm that patients are more likely to choose practices
with higher quality. Total QOF points for 2006/7 perform a little better than total
points for 2010/11 or the 2006/7–2010/11 average of total points. Many of the other
measures of quality are insignificant conditional on inclusion of total 2006/7 QOF
points. We therefore retain our baseline single-quality measure (2006/7 total QOF
points) because it is correlated with other measures of quality (see Appendix Table
C4), is simpler than models with multiple quality measures and has a better fit than
other models with a single quality measure. Total QOF points are also plausible as a
measure which affects patient choices since these were publicly reported on the NHS
Choices website aimed at informing patient choice.
Because of the importance of distance in determining practice choice we
investigated the robustness of the baseline model to alternative polynomial functions
(linear to quintic) of distance. Figure 3 plots the average marginal effect of distance on
the probability of choice of practice and shows that the negative marginal effects of
distance decrease with distance in all the specifications. The effect of quality is positive
and significant in all specifications. Including squared and cubed distance reduces
the coefficient on quality slightly but further addition of fourth and fifth powers leaves
the quality coefficient unchanged and renders some of the powers of distance statistically
insignificant.21 We therefore use the cubic specification as our baseline model.
4.2. Is There Heterogeneity in Patient Preferences?
We begin by examining observed heterogeneity by age and gender. Previous literature
has suggested that preferences for medical practitioners differ across men and women
and individuals of different ages. We estimate separate models for 12 age and gender
groups, using the same specification as the baseline model. We report the quality and
distance coefficients in Table 3. Preferences for quality and distance appear to be
non-linear in age. Women in the middle age groups have larger quality coefficients and
less negative distance coefficients. While differences in coefficients across age groups
20 This literature suggests that female patients prefer consultations with female GPs, so we should, and do,
find individuals are more likely to choose practices with a higher proportion of female GPs. GPs who have
qualified outside Europe are less likely to have English as a first language and so may be perceived as being
less able to communicate effectively with patients. The positive effect of a practice opting-out of providing
services to patients outside normal working hours may seem paradoxical. However, patients at a practice
which has opted-out will not necessarily experience worse access. When practices opt-out the responsibility
for providing out-of-hours care for their patients passes to the PCT. This need not lead to a reduction in the
availability of out-of-hours care for patients compared to practices which do not opt-out because much of the
out-of-hours care is subcontracted to deputising services. It may also be that practices which opt-out are then
able to provide better care during normal hours. Individuals may prefer practices with PMS contracts because
PMS contracts usually require the practice to provide additional services.
21 A model using the log of distance had a slightly smaller coefficient on quality (0.00216***) but worse
overall fit (McFadden R2 = 0.3655). Results for all models are available in Appendix Table C8.
© 2015 The Authors.
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may be due to differences in the scale on which utility is measured for different age
groups, the ratio of the marginal utilities on quality and distance is invariant to scaling
and so differences in the MRS reflect differences in preferences across age groups. The
MRS estimates show that middle-aged women place a higher value on quality relative to
the distance they are willing to travel to a practice. Men seem to have more
homogeneous preferences with the exception of the youngest age (25–34) group. This
group have both the smallest marginal utility from quality coefficient across all age and
gender groups and by far the lowest willingness to travel for higher quality. Men in this
age are the lowest users of GP care (Hippisley-Cox et al., 2007) and therefore may not
place a high value on quality.
Table 4 allows for heterogeneity of preferences between individuals resident in
different types of small area. In all cases patients are more likely to choose practices
which have higher quality and are closer, but there are some differences across small
area characteristics. Residents of rural areas have a slightly higher MRS of quality for
distance to those in urban areas. Individuals in LSOAs with fewer income-deprived
residents and those in LSOAs with better educated populations have substantially
higher MRS of quality against distance compared with those in more deprived or worse
educated LSOAs. Residents in LSOAs with healthier populations place a higher value
on quality relative to distance than those in LSOAs with less healthy populations. Those
A
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Fig. 3. Estimates of the Average Marginal Effects of Distance
Notes. Plot of Tð Þ1 PaPj2Ca P^ aj ½ f ðdaj ; b^dÞ;  f1  P^ aj ½ f ðdaj ; b^dÞ; g @f ðdaj ; b^dÞ=@dahÞ where
P^aj ½f ðdaj ; b^dÞ;  is the predicted probability of choice of practice evaluated at the mean of quality
and of the non-distance explanatories, T is the number of LSOA-practice combinations and
f ðdaj ; b^dÞ is a linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic or quintic function of distance. P^aj ½f ðdaj ; b^dÞ;  is
derived from models with same quality measure and covariates as Table 2.
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in LSOAs with a higher Asian population proportion place a higher value on quality
relative to distance than those in LSOAs with a smaller Asian population proportion.
Finally, residents in LSOAs with a high population inflow have higher MRS between
quality and distance than those in low inflow LSOAs.
These differences in the weight that individuals in different types of LSOA place on
quality when choosing a practice seem plausible. Individuals in rural areas expect to
travel further for all types of services, so they are more willing to travel for a practice
with higher quality than patients in urban areas. Residents in LSOAs with fewer
income-deprived individuals may be more able to take time off work without incurring
a financial penalty and so be less concerned about the travel time required to use their
GP than residents in LSOAs with higher income deprivation. Residents of LSOAs with
better educated populations may be better able to find, and interpret, measures of
practice quality. Our finding that patients in LSOAs with healthier populations place a
higher value on quality relative to distance than those in LSOAs with less healthy
populations again supports a travel cost story: less healthy patients want to be closer to
their practice because they expect to visit it more frequently. The fact that Asian or
British Asian residents on average have more morbidity for many conditions treatable
in primary care such as diabetes and heart disease (Scarborough et al., 2010) may
explain why residents in LSOAs with a higher proportion of Asian or British Asian
population place a greater weight on quality. New residents are more likely to have
chosen their practices more recently and will – unlike earlier choosers of a practice –
have had access to the publicly available QOF scores when making their choice.
Thus, new arrivals in an area might be expected to have better information about
quality than established residents and so small areas characterised by more new arrivals
(as measured by the inflow rate) will give greater weight to quality.22
The models in Tables 3 and 4 allow for observed heterogeneity. Table 5 compares
the results from a mixed logit model, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity, with
those from our baseline conditional logit specification. SDs of the mixed logit
coefficients are not significantly different from zero except for the distance and quality
variables. The mean mixed logit model coefficients on quality and distance are larger
than those from the conditional logit model. The mixed logit MRS between distance
and quality shows the distance an individual with average preferences would be willing
to travel for an additional QOF point. This is only a little greater than the estimate
from the conditional logit model (3.5 versus 3.0 metres). We, therefore, feel that the
estimates from the simpler conditional logit baseline model are a reasonable
representation of average preferences over practice characteristics.
4.3. Robustness to Specification of the Choice Set: Catchment Areas and Closed Lists
In interpreting the results, we assume that practice lists reflect patient preferences
rather than practice decisions. But, as noted in Section 1, there are two potential
constraints on patient choice. First, practices can agree a catchment area with their
PCT and are not obliged to accept patients living outside this catchment area. If we
22 Alternatively, it may be the case that new residents are richer, healthier or better educated – all factors
which the results in Table 4 suggest increase the valuation of quality relative to distance.
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Table 5
Choice Model: Mixed and Conditional Logit Specification
Mixed logit Conditional logit
Mean of coefficients Co-efficient
QOF 2006/7 total points 0.00294*** 0.00222***
(0.00027) (0.00016)
Distance km 1.596*** 1.606***
(0.04167) (0.04044)
Distance squared km 0.113*** 0.126***
(0.01238) (0.01189)
Distance cubic km 0.00419*** 0.00447***
(0.00093) (0.00091)
Practice in different PCT 0.923*** 0.881***
(0.07095) (0.04436)
Average GP age (months) 0.00217*** 0.00214***
(0.00014) (0.00014)
Percentage of female GPs 0.00236*** 0.00239***
(0.000341) (0.000336)
Percentage of non-European qualified GPs 0.00521*** 0.00527***
(0.000285) (0.000281)
Opted out of 24 hours obligation 0.167*** 0.160***
(0.0373) (0.03748)
PMS contract 0.154*** 0.148***
(0.03322) (0.03317)
Distance 0.784*** 0.751***
(0.018) (0.016)
MRS distance for quality 0.00352*** 0.00296***
(0.00033) (0.00022)
SD of coefficients
QOF 2006/7 total points 0.00333***
(0.00049)
Distance km 0.212***
(0.02589)
Distance squared km 0.0000127
(0.00386)
Distance cubic km 0.000261
(0.00028)
Practice in different PCT 0.368
(0.25843)
Average GP age (months) 0.00040
(0.00049)
Percentage of female GPs 0.000192
(0.000352)
Percentage of non-European qualified GPs 0.000971
(0.000595)
Opted out of 24 hours obligation 0.253
(0.1478)
PMS contract 0.0525
(0.2927)
BIC 11,587,409 11,597,725
Notes. For the mixed and conditional logit models the distance coefficient is b^d þ 2b^d2 d þ 3b^d3d2 where d and
d2 are computed as the mean of the LSOA centroid to practice distance and squared distance for the whole
sample. Mixed logit model estimated with Stata mixlogit. MRS is the coefficient on quality divided by the
coefficient on distance. For the mixed logit the mean coefficients are used. Delta method (nlcom) used to
compute standard errors on the MRS. Both models have 3,335,061 patients, 2,870 LSOAs, 973 practices. Both
models also contain a dummy for practices with missing PMS status. Standard errors clustered at LSOA level
are in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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specify LSOA choice sets with a radius greater than that of practice catchment areas,
then the estimated negative effect of distance will overstate the effect of distance on
patient choices. But if our assumed choice set radii are smaller than practice catchment
areas radii, the estimated model coefficients will be consistent, given the assumed
preferences and error distribution, since we are observing patient rather than practice
choices within a choice set which is independent of patient choices and therefore
satisfies the uniform conditioning property of McFadden (1978). Further, the ability of
practices to set catchment areas will not in itself produce an association between the
proportion of an LSOA’s patients choosing a practice and the practice’s quality. It is
possible that a practice whose patients are closer to the practice will have higher
quality, either because it is harder to achieve higher quality if there is less contact
between patients and GPs or because practices with higher quality have higher demand
from patients and ration demand by setting smaller catchment areas for any given list
size desired by the practice. Either of these mechanisms would lead to a negative
association between practice quality and the average distance from the practice of the
practice’s patients from all LSOAs in its catchment area. But it would not imply any
relationship between practice quality and the proportion of patients in any particular
LSOA choosing the practice.
The second constraint on patient choice of practice is that practices can, with the
agreement of their PCT, formally close their lists to new patients for between 3 and
12 months at a time. Some practices also declare informally that their lists are ‘open
but full’ and they are not accepting new patients. However, for practices intending to
stay in business, list closures must be temporary since each year around 8% of patients
will leave a practice list (primarily because of residential moves) (Hippisley-Cox et al.,
2005). At any time around 2% of practices have formally closed lists and possibly up to
10% have open but full lists. Given this, list closure only affects the choices of a small
minority of patients. So we think our estimates are unlikely to be substantially biased by
catchment areas or temporary list closure.
However, to examine these concerns we undertake two robustness tests. The first
examines the effect of both catchment areas and list closure. We examine the sensitivity
of the estimates of the effects of distance, quality and other practice characteristics to
our specification of choice set radius. Since practices can ration demand by restricting
their catchment areas and by temporary list closure it is less likely that practices with
smaller catchment areas are also closing their lists. We therefore estimate models in
which the radius of the choice set for LSOAs is restricted progressively from 10 km (our
baseline model) down to 8 km, 6 km, 4 km and 2 km, which allows us to compare
estimates across radii.23 Second, to examine the effect of list closure, we estimate
separate models for LSOAs in the top quintile and bottom four quintiles of population
growth. The faster the population in an area is growing, the more likely is it that there
will be excess demand and more frequent recourse to closed lists.
23 We also estimated models in which the choice set for an LSOA was defined as the set of all practices
within 10 km and which had at least a specified numbers of patients from the LSOA on its list. This ensured
that the LSOA was within the practice catchment area at some point over the previous years. Although these
choice sets are partly choice based and so do not satisfy the uniform conditioning property, the results were
very similar to those from the baseline model (Santos et al., 2013).
© 2015 The Authors.
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A finding of little difference in estimates across models suggests that our results
reflect patient choices and preferences rather than GP rationing of demand via
catchment areas and list closure. Table 6 presents these estimates. Columns (1)–(5)
show that the coefficient on quality is remarkably stable across models with different
choice set radii but the MRS of distance for quality falls as the choice set radius shrinks
because the distance coefficient increases.24 This is in line with Figure 3 which shows
the effect of distance from the cubic model with a 10 km choice set radius declines with
distance (see Appendix Table C11 for the full results). In column (6), we allow for
different choice sets across rural and urban residents. We estimate a model with larger
(7 km) choice sets for rural LSOAs than for urban LSOAs (3 km).25 The quality
coefficient is similar to those in the other models and the MRS between quality and
distance is greater than in our baseline 10 km choice model because the effect of
distance is greater. Column (7) shows the results for slower growing LSOAs. These are
very similar to the baseline 10 km choice model. While faster growing LSOAs are more
likely to have practices attempting to ration demand and so have smaller catchment
areas and more temporary list closures, column (8) shows that quality still has a
significant effect on individual demand in these areas. In fact the coefficient on quality
is somewhat greater than its estimated effect in the baseline model, giving a higher
MRS between quality and distance where population inflow is higher. This perhaps
reflects the fact that in such areas there are more patients who have made choices
more recently.
In sum, the similarity of the estimates across the models in Table 6 suggests that the
choice process is similar across the choice sets. We conclude that our estimates are
robust to potential GP ability to set catchment areas or temporarily closed lists. The
results also suggest that catchment areas are not constraining patients’ choice amongst
practices.26
4.4. Endogeneity of Quality
It is possible that practice quality is determined in part by the demographic, socio-
economic and health characteristics of the patients on its list. For example, some
patient population may make it easier for practices to achieve their QOF targets.
Further, if different patient types have different preferences over practice character-
istics, the quality measure may be correlated with unobserved demand factors.
Endogeneity bias could go either way: practices which are better could attract more
complex patients with whom it is more difficult to achieve QOF points, or better
educated individuals who may be easier to treat may be more likely to choose better
24 Because our preferred distance specification is cubic the marginal disutility of distance (and the MRS)
depend on LSOA to practice distance as well as patient preferences. The average distance to practices in the
choice set varies across our models and to ensure that differences in the marginal disutility and in the MRS
reflect differences in preferences rather than differences in distance, we use the mean LSOA to practice
distances from the 10 km model to compute the marginal disutility of distance and the MRS for all models.
25 91.9% of residents in rural LSOAs choose a practice within 7 km and 91.5% of those in urban areas
choose a practice within 3 km.
26 One corollary that proposed policy changes (as of 2015) to remove a practice’s right to set catchment
areas will not have a large effect.
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practices. Our use of a lagged measure of practice quality should reduce this source of
endogeneity bias. However, measurement error and unobserved practice characteris-
tics affecting demand and correlated with quality may also contribute to endogeneity.
To allow for possible endogeneity from all sources, we estimate a model in which we
instrument practice quality. To motivate our choice of instrument, we use the fact that
PCTs had clinical governance responsibility for their practices. They monitored the
prescribing of their practices, inspected their premises, audited their QOF returns,
provided financial assistance for practice computing and financed community nurses
to complement GP services. They also provided information to practices comparing
their performance with other practices in the PCT. All these activities were intended to
increase quality of care in their area and so are likely to affect the QOF performance of
all their practices. This suggests that the average quality of all other practices in the
PCT is likely to be a good predictor of a practice’s quality. We therefore use this
instrument to examine the possible bias in our estimates due to endogeneity.
We implement our IV estimates using two-stage residual inclusion (Terza et al.,
2008). We first estimate an OLS model of practice quality for all practices in the choice
sets of LSOAs in the East Midlands. In addition to the instrument, the first-stage quality
model contains the variables in the choice model, averaged over the LSOAs whose
choice sets contain the practice. The residuals from the first stage model are included
in the second stage conditional logit model as an additional explanatory variable. The
estimated coefficient on the quality measure in the choice model is an unbiased
estimate of the effect of quality if the instrument is valid. We bootstrap the standard
errors on the coefficients in the second stage choice model.27 The upper part of Table
7 reports the first stage results. The IV for quality has an F-statistic of 16.53, comfortably
greater than the conventional critical value of 10 (Stock et al., 2002). The lower part of
Table 7 presents the second stage. The coefficient on instrumented quality is around
three times as large as on un-instrumented quality and, since the coefficient on
distance is almost unchanged, the MRS is also three times as large. However, the
quality residuals are not significant in this 2SRI second stage (p = 0.057), so we cannot
reject the null of no endogeneity. Given these results from the instrumented quality
model, we prefer to use the more conservative estimates from the non-instrumented
model. These will, if anything, underestimate the effects of quality on demand.28
27 We draw 100 random bootstrap samples of 2,870 LSOAs with replacement. For each bootstrap sample,
we estimate the first-stage quality model for the practices in the choice sets of LSOAs in the sample. We
estimate the second stage choice model for each bootstrap sample of LSOAs, adding the residuals from the
first stage quality regression. We then compute the SD of the 100 estimates of the second stage coefficients.
28 We also considered local input prices for labour, land and buildings, as measured by the Market Forces
Factors (MFF) constructed by the Department of Health, as potential instruments. They were weak instru-
ments (the largest first stage F-statistic, on the staff MFF, was 3.88) and had the wrong (positive) sign in the
first stage, suggesting that there were unobserved area amenity factors which drive up input prices and attract
a population for whom it is easier to achieve QOF points. Some of the other practices in the same PCT as the
practice will be in the same LSOA choice sets. Their quality may affect demand for the practice. Using the
mean quality of all other practices, both rivals and non-rivals, in the PCT will mitigate this violation of
the exclusion restriction. To examine this further, we estimated a 2SRI model using the average quality of
non-rival practices in the same PCT as the instrument. It was a weaker instrument than the average quality
of all other practices in the PCT (first stage F = 2.22) but the second stage coefficient on instrumented
quality was highly significant and nearly five times (0.0108, SE = 0.003) as large as the un-instrumented
quality coefficient. See Appendix Table C12.
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Table 7
Choice Model with Instrumented General Practice Quality
First stage OLS model of practice quality
Co-efficient
IV: Mean quality all other practices in PCT 0.530***
(0.130)
Different PCT 9.672
(6.048)
Distance 36.23
(919.393)
Distance squared 5.668
(3.57)
Distance cubed 0.253
(0.205)
Av GP age months 0.1045**
(0.0350)
Percentage of female GPs 0.1295
(0.0950)
Percentage of non-European qualified GPs 0.1927**
(0.07600)
Opted out 11.34*
(4.75)
PMS contract 10.08
(5.25)
Constant 552.4***
(128.8)
F test on IV 16.53
Second stage: choice of practice (conditional logit)
Full sample
model
coefficient
Full sample
model SE
Mean
coefficient
bootstrap
samples
SD of coefficient
in bootstrap
samples
QOF 2006/7 total points 0.00622** (0.00211) 0.00615 (0.00215)
1st stage residual QOF
2006/7
0.00398 (0.00209) 0.00390 (0.00212)
Distance 0.7517*** (0.0163) 0.75071 (0.01602)
Practice in different PCT 0.882*** (0.044) 0.87626 (0.03927)
Average GP age (months) 0.00175*** (0.00025) 0.00172 (0.00027)
Percentage of female GPs 0.00194*** (0.00041) 0.00199 (0.00035)
Percentage of non-European qualified GPs 0.00448*** (0.00051) 0.00450 (0.00053)
Opted out of 24 hours obligation 0.115** (0.043) 0.10720 (0.04163)
PMS contract 0.106** (0.038) 0.09971 (0.03821)
BIC 11,596,983 38,756,048 225,710
McFadden R2 0.3992 0.39903 0.00404
MRS 0.0083** (0.0028) 0.00821 0.00288
Notes. First stage model: practice QOF 2006/7 points regressed on mean of QOF 2006/7 points of all other
practices in the same PCT and on means of all other explanatories in practice choice model taken over all
LSOAs whose choice set includes the practice, with SEs clustered on PCTs. Second stage models: conditional
logit models of practice choice with all explanatories from model in Table 2 plus quality residuals from first
stage model. For the second stage practice choice models, we report the coefficients and SEs from the 2SRI
model estimated with the full sample of LSOAs, the average of the coefficients estimated in the bootstrap
samples and the SD of the coefficient from bootstrap model. The coefficient on distance is
b^d þ 2b^d2 d þ 3b^d3d2 where d and d2 are computed as the mean of the LSOA centroid to practice distance
and squared distance for the whole sample. MRS is the coefficient on distance divided by the coefficient on
quality. Second stage standard errors are clustered at LSOA level. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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5. The Estimated Effect of Quality on Demand
We use the results from the baseline model of Table 2 to illustrate the importance
of quality for patients and practices. First, we examine how much further individuals
will be willing to travel for a 1 SD change in quality and how this compares to their
willingness to trade distance for other practice characteristics (e.g. the percentage
of female GPs). Second, we examine one aspect of practices’ incentives to increase
their quality by estimating how many patients a practice will gain from a 1 SD
increase in its quality. Third, we investigate the extent to which practices will lose
patients when a rival increases its quality. If practices gain a large number of
patients when their quality increases or lose them when rivals increase their quality,
then relaxing constraints on choice is likely to increase GPs’ incentives to provide
higher quality.
Table 8 summarises the estimated effect of quality and other practice characteristics
on individual’s practice choice in a number of different metrics. Columns (1)–(3)
examine individual level preferences for a characteristic with respect to distance. The
first column re-reports the coefficients from the baseline model. These show
the marginal utility (up to a linear transformation) from a one-unit increase in
practice characteristics. QOF quality is measured as points, average GP age in months,
female and non-European qualified GPs are measured as percentages, rather than as
proportions. Column (2) shows the number of additional metres a patient would be
Table 8
Effect Sizes for Quality and Other Practice Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Co-efficient
Extra
metres for
1 unit increase
Extra metres
for 1 SD
increase
Average
marginal
effect
Patients
gained from
1 SD increase
Percentage
increase in
practice list
from 1 SD
increase
QOF total
points
2006/7
0.00222 2.96 191 0.0000786 917 16.48
(0.00016) (0.22) (14) (0.0000129) (94) (1.69)
Average
GP age
(months)
0.00214 2.85 229 0.0000758 1,002 18.01
(0.00014) (0.19) (15) 0.0000062) (51) (0.92)
% female
GPs
0.00239 3.18 79 0.0000845 351 6.31
(0.00034) (0.45) (11) (0.0000130) (34) (0.61)
% non-Europ
qualif GPs
0.00527 7.02 247 0.0001867 1,085 19.50
(0.00028) (0.39) (14) (0.0000192) (70) (1.26)
Notes. Extra metres: number of extra metres patients would be willing to travel for practice characteristic
greater by 1 unit (column (2)) or 1 SD units (column (3)) increase in characteristic. Average marginal effect:
average change in probability of patients from an LSOA choosing a practice from 1 unit increase in
characteristic (1 QOF point, 1 month of average GP age, 1% female and non-European qualified GPs).
Patients gained: number of additional patients aged 25 and over choosing a practice if characteristic
increased by 1 SD. Average marginal effects, average estimated patients gained and % increase in list are
computed for the 415 practices which have at least 99% of their patients from LSOAs in the East Midlands.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All coefficients and effects are significant at 0.1%. See Appendix B for
details of calculations.
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willing to travel to a practice if each practice characteristic increased by one unit. As the
different characteristics are measured in different units, column (3) reports the
number of additional metres an individual would be willing to travel if a characteristic
increased by 1 SD.
As the average individual chooses a practice just under 2 km away, our results show
they would be willing to travel about 10% further if a practice had a 1 SD increase (65
QOF points) in quality. The absolute values of the effects of a 1 SD increase are
roughly of the same order of magnitude for quality, the average age of GPs and the
percentage of non-European qualified GPs. By contrast, increasing the percentage of
female GPs by 1 SD (25%, equivalent to replacing a male GP with a female GP in a
four-GP practice) has a much smaller effect on individuals’ willingness to travel further
to a practice.
Columns (4)–(6) examine the estimated effect on practices. Column (4) reports the
average marginal effects on the probability that a patient will choose a practice. These
are tiny but what matters for the incentive for practices to increase quality is the
number of patients they will gain. This depends both on the (small) effect of quality on
the probability of any one patient choosing the practice and the (large) number of
patients in whose choice set the practice lies and whose probabilities of choosing the
practice are increased. An average practice has 74,529 potential patients aged 25 and
over resident within 5 km and 25,070 within 2 km. Column (5) shows that the
estimated increase in number of patients in a practice from a 1 SD increase in quality is
917. For comparison, the absolute values of the change in the number of patients from
a 1 SD (80 months) increase in GP average age and in the percentage of non-
European qualified GPs (35%) are similar to those for quality, whilst the increase in
patient numbers from a 1 SD increase in the percentage of female GPs is about half
the size of that of a 1 SD change in quality.29
Column (6) presents these increases as a proportion of the average number of
patients aged 25 and over registered with the practice. This shows the change in
patient numbers from a change in quality is important relative to the average
number of patients aged 25 and over at just under 17%.30 It should be noted that
these estimates are the long-run effects since our estimates are for a stock of
patients and average list turnover is around 8% per annum. The short-term effect
of changes in quality (and other practice characteristic changes) will therefore be
smaller.
We also examine practice cross-quality elasticities of demand to estimate how many
patients a practice will lose if one of its rivals increases its quality. (Details of the
computations are in Appendix B.) The larger the cross-quality elasticities, the more
likely is it that qualities are strategic substitutes and that in the long run the
equilibrium quality will rise as other practices will respond by increasing their quality
29 Note that columns (5) and (6) are computed for practices which draw at least 99% of their patients
from LSOAs in the East Midlands whereas columns (1)–(4) are based on all patients in East Midlands LSOAs.
See Appendix B for the details of the computations.
30 Our estimates do not take account of the very small proportion (Davies et al., 2013) of the population
who are not registered with a practice. Higher quality may induce some of them to register so these are likely
to be slight underestimates.
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thereby increasing equilibrium quality. Here we only estimate the short-run responses,
that is we assume that practices do not respond if they lose patients.
The average cross-practice quality elasticity is 0.044. But there is considerable
variation in the cross-quality elasticities and some cross-quality elasticities are relatively
large. Figure 4 plots the cross-practice quality elasticities against distance to the rival
practice whose quality has increased. While there is variation in cross-elasticities at any
given inter-practice distance, the plotted loess regression line shows that on average
cross-elasticities decline with the distance between practices. The mean cross-quality
elasticity of the average 14.7 practices within 4 km is 0.15, while the average 2.8 rivals
within 2 km have a mean cross-quality elasticity of 0.25. At longer distances, cross-
quality elasticities are essentially zero. Thus, our estimates suggest that practices
operate in geographically small markets, so close practices are substitutes while those
further away are not.
Finally, we illustrate the importance of quality in determining practice lists by using
our baseline model to estimate the number of patients a practice would have if patients
had no information about quality (or equivalently did not care about quality).31 We
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Fig. 4. Plot of Cross Practice Quality Elasticities against Distance to Other Practice
Notes. Cross-quality elasticity: % change in predicted number of patients in a practice resulting
from a 1% increase in quality (total QOF points 2006/7) of a rival practice. Two practices are
rivals if there is at least one LSOA choice set of which they are both members. Predictions are
from the coefficients from the model in Table 2 applied to practices which draw at least 99% of
their list from the East Midlands. The line is a loess regression of elasticity on distance.
31 This predicted list size is computed using coefficients from the baseline model with the quality
coefficient set to zero. This is equivalent to setting all qualities to the same value (including zero).
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Notes. Log percentage difference is ln½n^jðq06=7Þ=n^jð0Þ ¼ lnð1þ djÞ where n^jðq06=07Þ is the number
of patients predicted by the model in Table 2 to choose practice j when practices have their
actual 2006/7 total QOF points and n^jð0Þ is the number predicted from a model with the same
covariates and distance specification as Table 2 but with all practice qualities set to the same
value. dj is the proportionate difference.
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compare this to the predicted number of patients each practice has when patients have
information about quality, using the estimates from the baseline model and the actual
level of clinical quality used in estimation of the baseline model. The mean absolute
change in estimated lists is 6%, so is not trivial. Figure 5, top panel, shows the
distribution of the percentage change in the number of patients when quality is known
across all practices compared to when it is not known. This is skewed to the left, with
practices in the lower tail of the distribution predicted to lose a significant proportion
of patients when quality is revealed. The lower part of Figure 5 plots the absolute gain
against the 2006/7 QOF points of each practice. This clearly shows that practices which
lose patients are those with low quality and those that gain are those with high quality.
Our predictions therefore support the idea that the introduction of greater choice, or
better information about quality, would lead to patients choosing higher quality
practices.
6. Conclusion
The issue of whether choice and competition will increase the quality of health care
services is both current and important. A prerequisite for increased competition to
increase quality is that demanders are responsive to quality. We test whether this
condition is satisfied in an important setting: the choice by patients of their family
physicians. In the context we examine, these physician practices are important as they
determine access to both primary and elective hospital health care services at zero
direct monetary cost for the patient. Further, this context is not atypical: family doctors
are important in many health care systems, they are the first (and often mandated)
point of contact with health services and have low or zero direct user cost.
We examine the choices of 3.4 million individuals from amongst nearly 1,000 family
doctor practices in a region of England. We find that clinical quality is important:
individuals are more likely to choose practices with higher measured and published
quality. They trade-off quality against distance. The results are robust to alternative
estimation methods, to the way in which distance is assumed to affect choice of practice
and to possible restrictions on choice sets through the imposition of catchment areas
and practices closing their lists for short periods to new patients.
We find some evidence of observed patient heterogeneity, with indication that low
users (young men) care less about quality than other groups. We also find that those
who live in small areas which are more deprived, or have less healthy or less educated
populations, care less about quality relative to distance than others. But the size of the
differences in the trade-offs between quality and distance between these and other
groups is relatively small. There was also little difference between those in areas with
low and high proportions of the population of Asian origin in willingness to trade-off
quality for distance. This is in contrast to findings for some other services. Schneider
et al. (1998, 2000) and Jacob and Lefgren (2007) report substantial race, class and
income differences in household preferences for schools in the USA. In England,
Burgess et al. (2014) find that higher income parents are more likely to value
educational attainment whilst lower income parents are more likely to value proximity.
Banks et al. (2010) and Smith et al. (2010), for the UK and the US respectively show
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strong correlations between an individual’s numerical ability and their wealth,
financial knowledge and their asset portfolio choices.
We exploit our estimates to look at the effect of quality on practice choice in order to
provide an assessment of the impact of a policy to promote greater choice of family
doctor. While the estimated effect of quality on the probability of any individual
choosing a family practice is small, what matters for practice incentives is how many
additional patients will be attracted by an increase in quality. This depends both on the
effect of quality on the probability of choice by an individual and on the (large)
number of individuals who could potentially choose the practice. Using the most
conservative of our model specifications, we estimate that a 1 SD increase in measured
clinical quality would, in the long run and with no response by rivals, attract
approximately 17% more patients to a family practice. Even in the short run this
implies large financial rewards as around 75% of practice income is linked to the
number of individuals who register with the practice. We also show that, relative to a
position with no quality information, practices that gain from the publication of quality
are those with higher clinical quality. Finally, our estimated cross-elasticities suggest
that these primary care markets are very local: competition for practices comes from a
small number of rivals located within a short distance.
Our findings support the argument that the promotion of greater choice of family
doctor and provision of information about quality have the potential to benefit
patients by increasing quality. Provided the marginal revenue from an additional
patient sufficiently exceeds marginal cost, greater competition in this market means
that family doctors have an incentive to improve their quality to attract patients. The
similarity between patient groups in terms of trade-offs between clinical quality and
distance indicates that such a policy would benefit individuals across all age, gender,
morbidity and socio-economic status groups but would particularly benefit those who
currently use practices of low clinical quality.
Appendix A. Alternative Quality Measures
A.1. Alternative Measures
Our baseline quality measure is total QOF points for 2006/7. We also consider the 2006/7 points
obtained in the different domains of the QOF, and total QOF points for 2009/10 and the
average of total QOF points for the four years 2006/7–2009/10.
The indicators in the QOF were based on evidence on the effects of the incentivised activities
on patient health.32 But as a measure of clinical quality QOF points have two potential
drawbacks. Up to 665 of the 1,000 QOF points are awarded for having disease registers and for
the percentage of eligible patients in a disease area for whom various indicators are achieved.33
No points were awarded for achievement less than 40% and points increased linearly with
percentage achievement above 40% up to an upper threshold ranging from 60% to 90%, with no
points earned for further increases in achievement. In addition, some practices appear to have
32 It has been shown that better QOF performance is associated with fewer emergency hospitalisations for
conditions which should be managed in primary care. See, for example Dusheiko et al. (2011).
33 For example, indicator DM7 is the proportion (N/D) of eligible diabetic patients whose HbA1c was 10
or less and carried 11 points, where N is the number of patients for whom the indicator is achieved and D is
the number who are declared eligible for the indicator.
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designated patients as ‘exceptions’ to increase their reported achievement (Gravelle et al., 2010).
Thus, points are an imperfect measure of actual achievement on a clinical indicator. In
robustness tests, we use the raw QOF data on clinical indicators to construct measures (reported
achievement and population achievement) which are not affected by upper and lower thresholds
and exception reporting.
We also examine non-QOF-based measures of quality. The first is a measure of the quality of
practice disease management: the practice’s total annual emergency admission rate for
ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs), listed in Table C2. ACSCs are conditions for
which good quality management in general practice should prevent emergency admissions for
complications (Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research, 2007; Purdy et al., 2009). ACSCs
admission rates are used as measures of access to good quality primary care in many healthcare
systems.
The second set of non-QOF measures are derived from the 2009 GP Patient Survey which was
sent to a random sample of patients in all practices in England. We use the answers to three
questions. The first question concerns general satisfaction (‘In general, how satisfied are you
with the care you get at your GP surgery or health centre?’). The second question is about
satisfaction with opening hours (‘How satisfied are you with the hours that your GP surgery or
health centre is open?’). Patients answer both questions on a 5-point scale and we use the
proportion of the practice respondents who say they were ‘Very satisfied’ or ‘Fairly satisfied’. The
third question asks patients ‘Would you recommend your GP surgery or health centre to
someone who has just moved to your local area?’ and we use the proportion of respondents who
report ‘Yes, would definitely recommend’ or ‘Yes, might recommend’, as opposed to ‘Not sure’,
‘No, would probably not recommend’, ‘No, would definitely not recommend’ or ‘Don’t know’.
These measures are based on an achieved sample of 5% of patients, whilst the ACSC admission
rate and QOF points are based on all relevant patients. Descriptive statistics for the different
quality measures are reported in Table C3.
There are reasonably high correlations amongst the QOF points measures (Table C4).34
Although the QOF was intended to improve care for long-term conditions and to reduce hospital
admissions, there is only a weak negative correlation between ACSCs and QOF points. This may be
because there are both negative and positive correlations between admissions for particular ACSCs
and the QOF clinical indicators for management of those conditions (Downing et al., 2007; Bottle
et al., 2008; Dusheiko et al., 2011; Purdy et al., 2011). The three patient-reported measures are
reasonably highly correlated with each other butmuch less well correlated with theQOFmeasures.
Finally, the reported achievement 2009/10 and population achievement 2009/10measures, which
use more of the information used to compute QOF clinical indicators, are highly though not
perfectly correlated with total 2009/10 QOF points and with each other.
A.2. Choice Models with Alternative Quality Measures
We estimated practice choice models with these alternative quality measures with models
including the same covariates and cubic distance specification as our baseline model. They had
very similar coefficients for distance and other practice characteristics as our baseline model.
We first estimate a model using the points from the separate domains of the 2006/7 QOF
(clinical, organisational, patient experience, additional services, holistic care). This gives a
slightly better overall fit than models which use only a single QOF points measure (Table C5).
However, two of the domains (holistic care and patient experience) have negative, though
insignificant, effects (possibly because of collinearity amongst the five components). A model
34 Note ACSC emergency admissions are a negative measure of quality. In some cases the high correlations
are due to the construction of the measures: clinical points contribute over 60% of total points, and the
holistic care points are based on performance in the third worst clinical domain.
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with only 2006/7 QOF clinical points had markedly smaller MRS against distance (0.0044; SE
0.0004) and slightly worse fit than the baseline model.
Second, we examine the choice of period for which the QOF points are reported. The QOF
was introduced 2004/5 but the number of disease areas covered was increased from 10 to 19 in
2006/7, so that we think that measures based on performance from 2006/7 onwards provide a
better measure of quality. If there were no switching costs then all patients on a practice list can
be considered to have chosen it recently, given their information on the current characteristics
of practices in their choice set. In this case, we would expect that current quality (2009/10 QOF
points) would be a better predictor of choices than 2006/7 QOF points or 2006/7–2009/10
average QOF points. However, we find (Table C5) that replacing 2006/7 total QOF points with
2009/10 total QOF points reduces that model fit slightly compared to these models and the
marginal rate of substitution between quality and distance is less precisely estimated (MRS 0.009;
SE 0.0002). At the other extreme, if switching costs were so high that no patient switched
practices unless they changed their LSOA of residence, then the observed practice lists would
reflect decisions made by annual cohorts of new residents whose choices were dependent on
quality observed in the year they arrived in the LSOA. The mean population inflow in the East
Midlands is around 5% per annum suggesting that the average patient observed on 1 April 2010
chose their practice about 10 years previously. This implies that 2006/7 QOF points should be a
better predictor of choice than average 2006/7–209/10 QOF points. We find that the model with
average 2006/7–2009/10 QOF points has larger MRS of distance for quality (0.0044; SE 0.0004)
but fits slightly less well than the baseline model with 2006/7 QOF points.
We constructed two further measures (reported and population achievement) from the raw
QOF data. They allow for lower and upper thresholds and exception reporting but neither
measure was significant when it replaced total 2006/7 QOF points in the baseline specification
and reported achievement had a negative sign (Table C6). We also estimated models with the
practice rate of emergency admissions for ambulatory sensitive conditions as a measure of
quality. When it was the only explanatory it had the appropriate (negative) sign and was
statistically significant. However, its coefficient was small and insignificant in the baseline
specification with or without total QOF 2006/7 points.
In Table C7, we examine patient satisfaction with their practice as a measure of quality. When
overall patient satisfaction is the only measure of quality and no other covariates included in the
model, patient satisfaction is strongly correlated with choice of practice. But when we also include
other practice characteristics and our baseline measure of clinical quality (total QOF 2006/7
points), the coefficient on overall patient satisfaction becomes negative and insignificant. Thus,
patient satisfaction seems to summarise the effect of practice characteristics on patient utility, as
suggested in Robertson et al. (2008) but makes no independent contribution to predicting patient
choice of practice. The coefficient for patient satisfaction with access was statistically significant
but of the wrong sign (negative) when entered as the only explanatory variable in the choice
model. This may be because practices with high demand have longer waits for consultations. As
with the overall satisfaction measure, satisfaction with access was insignificant when other practice
characteristics and total QOF 2006/7 points were included in the model. The patient survey
measure ‘would recommend’ is positively associated with choice but its coefficient fell six fold
reduction when practice characteristics and total QOF 2006/7 points were added to the model.
Appendix B. Calculation of Effects
B.1. Patients Gained
We report the estimated average number of additional patients a practice would receive from a
1 SD increase in practice characteristic xkj. We compute this by first computing the estimated
average number gained from a one unit increase in the characteristic:
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(B1)
where P^aj is the probability of patients from LSOA a choosing practice j, b^k is the estimated
coefficient on characteristic k, na is the number of patients in LSOA a and n^j ¼
P
a2Sj naP^ aj is the
predicted number of patients choosing practice j. Sj ¼ fa j 2 Caj g is the set of East Midlands
LSOAs whose choice sets include practice j. SJ* is the set of nJ* (= 415) practices which draw at
least 99% of their list from East Midland LSOAs.
About half the practices in the choice sets of the East Midlands LSOAs draw some of their
patients from LSOAs outside the East Midlands. Since we do not estimate P^aj for these LSOAs, we
compute the numbers gained for the 415 practices which draw at least 99% of their patients from
the East Midlands LSOAs.
B.2. Cross-practice Quality Elasticity and Distance
The estimated change in the number of patients choosing practice j if the quality of practice m
increases is
@n^j
@qm
¼
@
P
a2Sj\Sm naP^ aj
 
@qm
¼ 
X
a2Sj\Sm na b^q P^ aj P^ am ; (B2)
where P^aj is the probability of patients from LSOA a choosing practice j, P^am is the probability of
patients from LSOA a choosing practice m, na is the population of LSOA a. Sj ¼ a j 2 Cajf g,
Sm ¼ a m 2 Cajf g are the sets of East Midlands LSOAs whose choice sets include practice j, m. The
quality of practice m affects demand for practice j only by changing demand for j from LSOAs
which have choice sets which include both j and m. b^q is the estimated coefficient on quality.
The cross-elasticity of demand for practice j with respect to the quality of practice m is
eqjm ¼
@n^j
@qm
qm
n^j
¼
@
P
a2Sj\Sm naP^ aj
 
@qm
qm
n^j
¼ 
X
a2Sj\Sm na b^q P^ aj P^ am
qm
n^j
¼  b^qqm
n^j
X
a2Sj\Sm naP^ aj P^ am :
(B3)
We compute eqjm where j is in the set of practices S
J* which draw at least 99% of their list from
East Midland LSOAs (as in computation for the patient gain on own quality) and m is each of the
other practices included in at least one choice set of the set of practices in SJ*. There are 973
practices in the data set for our preferred specification but we compute fewer than 492 9 972
values of eqjm as Sj ∩ Sm will be empty if the distance djm between practice j and m is greater than
>20 km since LSOA choice sets have radius of at most 10 km.
We plot eqjm against the distance djm between practice j and practice m (Figure 4). We expect e
q
jm
to be smaller in absolute value as djm is greater since as djm increases the set of LSOAs in Sj ∩ Sm
will become smaller and so the increase in qm will affect fewer LSOAs which include practice j in
their choice sets. This respects Tobler’s first law of geography ‘Everything is related to everything
else, but near things are more related than distance things’.
B.3. Average Marginal Effect
We report (Table 8) the average change in probability of patients from an LSOA choosing
a practice from a unit increase in practice characteristic xkj, that is the average marginal
effect.
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The marginal effect for each of the na individuals in LSOA is
MEajk ¼ b^k P^aj 1 P^ aj
 
; (B4)
where P^aj is the probability of patients from LSOA a choosing practice j and b^k is the estimated
coefficient on characteristic k.
The average of MEajk over all the patients is
AMEk ¼
PNA
a
PN J
j MEajknaPNA
a naN
Ca
¼
PNA
a na
PN J
j MEajkPNA
a naN
Ca
¼
XNA
a
naPNA
a naN
Ca
 !XN J
j
MEajk ; (B5)
where na is the number of patients in LSOA a, Ca is the choice set of LSOA a, N
Ca is the number
practices in Ca.
We compute the numbers gained for the 415 practices which draw at least 99% of their
patients from the East Midlands LSOAs.
Appendix C. Additional Tables: Data, Alternative Quality Models, Robustness
Checks
Table C1
Data Sources
Data set Variables Source
Attribution Data
Set
Patients in each LSOA by age/
gender on each practice list
NHS England*
Quality and
Outcomes
Framework
QOF points total and by indicator;
numbers for whom indicator
achieved, exceptions
www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-collections/
audits-and-performance/the-quality-and-
outcomes-framework
GP Patient
Survey
Patient satisfaction with practice www.gp-patient.co.uk/archive_
weighted/practicereport
Hospital Episode
Statistics
Emergency admissions for
ambulatory care sensitive
conditions
www.hesonline.nhs.uk*
Health and Social Care
Information Centre*
General Medical
Service
Statistics
Age, gender, country of
qualification of GPs, practice
contract, out of hour status,
dispensing status, location
Health and Social Care
Information Centre*
NHS Choices Location of branch practices www.nhs.uk/Pages/
HomePage.aspx
Neighbourhood
Statistics
Socio-economic and demographic
measures at LSOA level.
Population turnover at MSOA
level
www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/
dissemination
Index of
Multiple
Deprivation
LSOA income deprivation,
proportion adults no educational
qualification
www.communities.gov.uk/publications/
communities/indicesdeprivation07
Office of
National
Statistics
LSOA rurality classification www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/
geography/products/area-classifications/
index.html
Notes. *Data released under Data Sharing Agreement requiring that it is not shared with a third party. HES
Copyright © 2006–2010, reused with the permission of The Health and Social Care Information Centre. All
rights reserved.
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Table C2
Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions: ICD10 Codes
Condition ICD10 codes
Asthma J45 J46
Circulatory system I110 I130 I132 I10 I119 I129 I139
COPD J20 J41 J42 J43 J44 J47 J40
Stroke/LVD I60 I61 I63 I64 I66 I672 I698 R470
EPILEPSY G40 G41 R56 G253 R568
CHD/LVD I20 I240 I248 I249 I25 R072 I21 I22 I110 I130 I132 I255
I50 J81
Diabetes E110 E111 E112 E113 E114 E115 E116 E117 E118 E119 E10
E120 E121 E122 E128 E130 E131 E132 E133 E134 E135 E136
E137 E138 E140 E141 E142 E143 E144 E145 E146 E147 E148
DKD or Dementia N03 F00 F01 F02 F03
Alcohol-related disease F10
Perforated appendix K350 K351
Dehydration & gastroenteritis A020 A04 A059 A072 A080 A081 A083 A082 A084 A085 A09
E86 K520 K521 K522 K528 K529
Cellulitis I891 L010 L011 L020 L021 L022 L023 L024 L028 L029
L03 L04 L080 L088 L089 L88 L980
ENT H66 H67 J02 J03 J040 J06 J312
Gangrene R02
Influenza and pneumonia A481 A70 J10 J11 J120 J121 J122 J128 J129 J13 J14 J153 J154
J157 J159
J160 J168 J18 J181 J189 J180 J188
Iron-deficiency anaemia D460 D461 D463 D464 D501 D508 D509 D510 D511 D512
D513 D518 D520 D521 D528 D529 D531 D571 D580 D581
D590 D591 D592 D599 D601 D608 D609 D610 D611 D640
D641 D642 D643 D644 D648 E40 E41 E42 E43 E550 E643
Other vaccine preventable diseases A35 A36 A37 A80 B05 B06 B161 B169 B180 B181 B26 G000
M014
Pelvic inflammatory N70 N73 N74
Perforated/bleeding ulcer K20 K210 K219 K221 K226 K250 K251 K252 K254 K255
K256 K260 K261 K262 K264 K265 K266 K270 K271 K272
K274 K275 K276 K280 K281 K282 K284 K285 K286 K920
K921 K922
Atrial fibrillation and flutter I498 R000 I471 I479 I499 R002 R008 I495
Constipation K590
Urinary infection N11 N136 N10 N151 N159 N12 N390 N300 N309 N308
Fracture proximal femur S722 S720 S721
Peripheral vascular disease I73 I738 I739
Failure to thrive R629
Dyspepsia K21 K30
Hypokalemia E876
Low birth weight P050 P052 P059 P072 P073
Migraine G43 G440 G441 G443 G444 G448 R51
Tuberculosis A15 A16 A17 A18 A19
Dental conditions A690 K098 K099 K02 K03 K04 K05 K06 K08 K12 K13
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Table C12
Choice Model with Instrumented General Practice Quality: Full Results
IV: mean quality all other practices in PCT IV: mean quality of non-rivals in PCT
First-stage model: practice quality (OLS) First-stage model: practice quality (OLS)
Coefficient Coefficient
IV 0.530*** 0.323
(128.8) (0.216)
Different PCT 9.672 1.452
(6.048) (11.152)
Distance 36.23 42.18
(919.393) (30.02)
Distance squared 5.668 6.307
(3.57) (5.953)
Distance cubed 0.253 0.241
(0.205) (0.357)
Av GP age months 0.1045** 0.1112*
(0.0350) (0.0438)
Percentage of
female GPs
0.1295 0.2151
(0.0950) (0.1393)
Percentage of
non-European
qualified GPs
0.1927** 0.2208
(0.07600) (0.1131)
Opted out 11.34* 7.406
(4.75) (7.6220)
PMS contract 10.08 11.41
(5.25) (7.65)
Constant 552.4*** 759.3**
(128.8) (218.2)
F test on IV 16.53 2.22
Second stage: choice of practice
(conditional logit)
Second stage: choice of practice
(conditional logit)
Full sample
model
coefficient
Mean coef
bootstrap
samples (SD of
coef in bootstrap
samples)
Full sample
model
coefficient
Mean coef
bootstrap
samples (SD of
coef in bootstrap
samples)
QOF 2006/7
total points
0.00622** 0.00615 0.0108*** 0.01080
(0.00211) (0.00215) (0.0025) (0.00264)
1st stage residual
QOF 2006/7
0.00398 0.00390 0.00855*** 0.00855
(0.00209) (0.00212) (0.00253) (0.00263)
Distance 0.7517*** 0.75071 0.7803*** 0.77919
(0.0163) (0.01602) (0.0177) (0.01786)
Practice in
different PCT
0.882*** 0.87626 0.921*** 0.91372
(0.044) (0.03927) (0.056) (0.04530)
Average GP
Age (months)
0.00175*** 0.00172 0.00185*** 0.00184
(0.00025) (0.00027) (0.00033) (0.00034)
Percentage of female GPs 0.00194*** 0.00199 0.000358 0.00031
(0.00041) (0.00035) (0.000639) (0.00065)
Percentage of non-European
qualified GPs
0.00448*** 0.00450 0.00289*** 0.00286
(0.00051) (0.00053) (0.00065) (0.00069)
Opted out 0.115** 0.10720 0.00397 0.01332
(0.043) (0.04163) (0.04991) (0.04564)
PMS contract 0.106** 0.09971 0.0283 0.03597
(0.038) (0.03821) (0.0524) (0.04823)
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